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Executive Summary  
 
This report reviews and analyses party financing regulation in 13 African countries, 
drawing on an in depth scrutiny of party legislation and personal interviews1 with 
representatives of nine different political parties2 in more than half of those countries 
(i.e. Angola, Malawi, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Uganda). It 
examines the complex dynamics between money and party politics, looking in 
particular at (1) how public funds are allocated, (2) how campaigns are financed, (3) 
the different options (and obstacles) parties face when trying to finance their ordinary 
activities, (4) the type and scope of financial disclosure and oversight, and (5) the 
extent to which financial violations are sanctioned. Overall, and despite variation in 
national contexts and national regulations, we find that (1) in most countries party 
financing regulations are shine by their absence, and (2) party competition is largely 
unequal. In this context, it is possible to conclude that while incumbents not only 
receive often the lion’s share of public and private funding, but also have 
unsupervised access to state resources; opposition parties face the highest hurdles to 
be able to perform key functions such as mobilization of voter support and electoral 
campaigning. 
 
Introduction 
 
Political parties are essential for the functioning of democracy (Schattschneider 1942). 
They perform a series of tasks linking the citizens to the political system (e.g. 
mobilization, socialization, articulation and aggregation of social interests), and 
structure the whole functioning of the government (e.g. selecting candidates for 
public office and policy-making) (Sartori 2005). But to effectively perform their 
functions, parties need to have strong organizations and (own) resources to 
financially support them.   
                                                 
1  All interviews were made face-to-face between the 22 and 23 of March 2019 in Marrakesh 
(Morocco). The only exception was with UNITA, whose representative was interviewed by phone on 
18 April 2019. 
2 The political parties included in the analysis are: the National for the Total Independence of Angola 
(UNITA); the Malawi Congress Party (MCP); the Independence Party (IP) in Morocco; the 
Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) and the Democratic Movement of Mozambique 
(MDM); the Popular Democratic Party (PDP) in Namibia; the Party for Democracy and Progress 
(Chadema) in Tanzania; the Ugandan Democratic Party (UDP) and the Forum for Democratic Change 
(FDC). 
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As much as elsewhere state funding is quintessential for the development of 
African political parties. However, the prevalence of dominant parties in many 
countries means that most resources – beyond direct/indirect public funding – stay in 
the hands of the “hegemonic” or “dominant” party in power. This has important 
implications for how party politics actually develops and, consequently, for the role 
that money plays in it. Moreover, and what is more important, this raises essential 
questions about (1) how is party funding regulated?, (2) how do parties raise money?, 
and (3) which challenges they face in their quest for sustainability? These questions 
matter not only because a proper regulatory (funding) framework can help to promote 
a fairer interparty competition, but also because of the significance both transparency 
and accountability have in the institutionalization of electoral politics and, more 
importantly, the consolidation of democracy in a country.3 
This report includes an overview of party finance regulations in 13 African 
countries, drawing on a set of documental sources – party and electoral laws –and 
interviews held with party representatives. The first two sections contain a brief 
overview of the relationship between money and politics, with a special attention to 
the African continent.  The subsequent sections examine the particularities displayed 
by party funding regulations in a selected number of African countries, with a special 
focus on the following dimensions: public and private funding, campaign donations 
and election spending, vote buying, oversight and sanctions. The analysis will look 
both at legal regulations and real life experiences as recounted by the party 
representatives interviewed. The final two sections present a summary of the main 
findings, suggesting recommendations for improvement.  
 
Money in Politics 
 
Money is “the mother’s milk of politics” (Stanbury 1986: 795). As posed by the 
British scholar Tim Haughton, the role of 
money can be best understood with reference to a motor race metaphor. 
Money is the fuel for the engines of party politics. Fuel does not determine 
which car is faster or who will win the race, but at high speeds cars need 
plenty of fuel, and vehicles need access to refueling stations during a long 
                                                 
3 In the sense of increasing the trust of citizens in the democratic system in general, and political 
parties in particular. 
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race (2012: 16-17). 
Given the centrality of money in party politics, and especially the 
generalization of party funding legislations with the expansion of democracy at the 
end of the Cold War, the interest of both scholars and practitioners in studying the 
causes and consequences of political funding regulation has increased over time. 
While the work on the determinants of party funding is still in its infancy 
(Casal Bértoa 2012), much more is known about the impact of political finance 
regulations on the development of political party organizations and party systems. 
Even if sometimes, scholarly findings seem contradictory. For example, in terms of 
the former (i.e. party organizations), Whiteley (2011) has sustained that the amount 
of party finance regulation acts as a deterrent for the partisan engagement of society, 
contributing to a decrease in party affiliation/membership in highly regulated 
countries. In clear contrast, Biezen and Kopecký (2017) have recently shown how, 
contrary to the “cartel thesis” expectations (Katz and Mair 1995), states subsidies 
have had a very “limited impact” (i.e. do not discourage) on party membership. 
Notwithstanding what has been said, public subsidies have been proved to 
exert a positive impact on both the levels of party responsiveness (Costa Lobo and 
Razzuoli 2017) and the survival rate of political party organizations, especially of 
those “between the thresholds”: namely, the electoral and the payout (Casal Bértoa 
and Spirova 2019; Casal Bértoa and Taleski 2016). 
Most studies, however, have focused on the effects party finance might have 
on party system institutionalization. As in the previous case, findings have been 
sometimes contradictory. While some early scholars did not observe a clear 
relationship between finance regulation and party system development (Scarrow 2006; 
Tavits 2006; Grzymała-Busse 2007; Biezen and Rashkova 2014); more recent studies 
have found an important, and positive, effect. 
First of all, various scholars have shown how state subsidies are a catalyst for 
party system institutionalization, as they help to (1) reduce the number of parties in a 
system (Booth and Robbins 2010), (2) close the structure of inter-party competition, 
making it more predictable (Casal Bértoa, 2017), and (3) decrease electoral volatility 
(Birnir 2005). And this is true not only in Europe, but also in Africa (Sanches 2018) 
and Latin America (Bruhm, 2016). More recently, Rama and Casal Bértoa (2019) 
found that state subsidies can also contribute to reduce the vote for “anti-political-
establishment” parties.  
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Adopting a more holistic approach, which combines both public and private 
funding regulation, Booth and Robbins (2010) also found how a restrictive regime of 
private funding discourages the formation of new parties, but only in those regimes 
where states subsidies are not available. In the same line, Sanches (2018) reveals that 
access to public funding and bans on private funding act together to close the 
structure of party competition in Africa, thus enhancing institutionalization over time. 
More generally, but focusing on campaign finance laws, Tavits and Potter (2015) 
found such reductive effect in more restrictive legislations, while conversely more 
permissive and liberal legislations tend to increase party systems’ size.  
But while high regulation of funding can have positive effects on the 
institutionalization / stabilization of inter-party competition, it has been also shown 
that citizens do not necessarily trust or identify more with political parties as result of 
more regulation (Whiteley 2014). Indeed, even if state subsidies can help reduce the 
levels of corruption (Hummel et al. 2018), both a high state dependency and a 
restrictive regime of distribution of public subsidies might have a counter-productive 
effect. And the same can be said of very restrictive private funding and sanctionatory 
regulations (Casal Bértoa et al. 2014). 
 
Political Parties in Africa  
 
The African democratic wave that started in the early 1990s, opened up a new 
window of opportunity for political party formation and allowed citizens across the 
continent to vote in multiparty elections for the first time ever or in decades. Today, 
some 30 years on, the outcomes of the democratic experiments are mixed 
(Cheeseman 2015). Some failed, others succeeded but regular multiparty elections are 
now commonplace across the continent. Even though there are many concerns about 
the quality of elections, their increasing acceptance as the legitimate way to choose a 
government is a significant departure from the past and can contribute to 
democratization (Lindberg 2006).  
The party systems emerging out of these elections function in quite distinctive 
ways (Lindberg 2007; Salih and Nordlund 2007; Riedl 2014; Sanches 2018). In 
countries like Botswana, Namibia and South Africa there has never been alternation 
in power but that did not prevent the development of a liberal form of democracy. Yet 
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this scenario is rather exceptional; dominant parties in Angola, Gambia, Gabon, 
Zimbabwe or Equatorial Guinea, for instance, often use institutions such as 
multiparty elections and parliaments, to prolong their authoritarian rule (Bogaards 
and Elischer 2016). In contrast, alternation in power has occurred in a handful of 
cases (e.g. Cape Verde, Mauritius, Ghana, Senegal, Benin, and more recently 
Seychelles, Nigeria), whereas party systems in Zambia, Comoros, Madagascar, 
Kenya, Mali, just to mention a few examples, remain fluid from the outset of the 
political liberalization.  
The political parties operating in these systems are different from the parties 
we know from western countries. African political parties have been depicted as 
weak political institutions, lacking mass membership, organizational capacity, 
funding base and human resources (Randall 2001; Salih and Nordlund 2007).  Other 
cited features include the incumbent’s advantage and unsupervised access to state 
resources, the weakness of opposition parties, pervasiveness of informal networks, 
lack of intra-party democracy, factionalism and floor-crossing, and, lack of strong 
articulated ideologies (Randall 2001; Salih and Nordlund 2007).  
Political parties in Africa face several difficulties to become financially self-
sufficient, principally where state funding is lacking or is poorly regulated. As result, 
in most countries, political parties (especially those in opposition) end up relying “on 
a small core group of individuals, businessmen and women, and foreign donors, 
party-to-party networks and fraternal organizations for funding their activities” (Salih 
and Nordlund 2007: 91). This can have far reaching effects on the nature of linkages 
between parties and their constituencies, which may be furthermore framed by 
personalistic and clientelistic relationships – known to be pervasive in Africa 
(Gyimah-Boadi 2007).   
It is commonly argued that political authority in the continent is essentially 
“based on giving and granting of favors, in an endless series of dyadic exchanges that 
go from the village level to the highest reaches of the central state” (van de Walle 
2001: 51). In this context political parties often “perceive state capture for the control 
of the resources and personnel of the state as a source of elite enrichment”; and 
politics itself becomes a means to an end, devoid of any idea of protecting public 
interests vis-à-vis private gains (Salih and Nordlund 2007: 21). Indeed, through many 
studies we came to understand that politics in the region is very much influenced by 
clientelar relationships, in which “vertical accountability modeled on the basis of 
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‘economies of affection’ means exchanging political support for personalized favors 
and benefits” (Lindberg and Morrison 2008: 102). Contrary to policy performance 
and programmatic evaluations, in this case votes are “exchanged based on the ability 
of the incumbent MP or opposition candidate to ‘buy’ votes and ‘take care of his 
people’, providing gifts, paying for fees, finding jobs, and showing concern on a 
personalized basis” (Lindberg and Morrison 2008: 102).  
In practice however, things are much more complex. The African voting 
behavior literature, presents inconclusive results about the effectiveness of vote 
buying as a mechanism for building support. Using round 2 Afrobarometer data on 
Zambia and Kenya, Young (2009) showed that personal and clientelistic interactions 
between citizens and members of parliaments (MPs) do not always benefit the 
incumbent party. Lindberg and Morrison (2008) study on Ghana, reveals that 
clientelism has little bearing in voters’ behavior: evaluative items such as past 
performance or the promised policy programs of candidates and parties have stronger 
effects. In a subsequent study, seeking to explain vote swing in Ghana, looking at 
various dimensions of MPs performance, Weghorst and Lindberg (2013) arrive to 
similar conclusions. In particular, they show that patron assistance (i.e. MP’s 
performance in terms of providing private goods and personal benefits to constituents) 
and clientelism supply (i.e. exposure to small gifts, cash, handouts, and similar things 
doled out by candidates ahead of elections) increase vote swing. However, when 
voters perceive politicians as providing collective, developmental goods, the efficacy 
of clientelism as a tool to garner voter support is reduced (Weghorst and Lindberg 
2013). 
All in all, these studies reveal, that money has influence in how politics is 
conducted in Africa, but the strength of this effect varies across countries, and 
interacts with other sources information citizens use to make their voting decisions.  
Still, the incumbent parties’ privileged access to state resources, the prevalence of 
clientelistic practices such as vote buying, raise concerns about the fairness and 
transparency of political competition, the nature of political representation, and 
ultimately the prospects of democratization in Africa.  
 
Political Party Finance in Africa 
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Public funding (direct and indirect) 
 
States can help to the funding of electoral politics in two different manners. First of 
all, and perhaps the most popular (and significant) way, states can grant political 
parties and/or electoral candidates access to public subsidies, which can be used 
either for covering (totally or partially) electoral expenses or for helping to finance 
the daily life of political organizations or, in some countries, for both. In most world 
regions (e.g. Europe, East and West, or Latin America) state guarantees parties and/or 
candidates some kind of direct financial help (Scarrow 2006; Casal Bértoa and 
Biezen2018). In others this is not the case: thus, only half of the countries in Asia do 
so (Mobrand et al., forthcoming). Secondly, states can also help parties (and 
candidates) in an indirect manner, and this can take multiple forms, from free media 
access, to special taxes via free or subsidized office space for political parties’ 
headquarters or local branches.  
 Out of the 13 African countries examined in this report, only four (i.e. 
Botswana, Zambia, Ghana and Sierra Leone) do not provide any type of direct 
political funding, neither for parties nor for candidates (see table 1 for a summary of 
the basic features of the regulations). In Botswana, one of the most exemplar 
democracies in Africa, political finance is completely unregulated. There are no 
mechanisms of direct or indirect funding nor is there any law regulating expenditures, 
or disclosure of funds (Somolekae 2005). This scenario favors the dominant party – 
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) – which has never been replaced in power since 
the first post-independence elections held in 1969, and has unsupervised access to 
state resources.  Smaller parties, have to find creative ways to be able to run a 
campaign and finance their activities4.  
Where direct funding is regulated, we find strike differences in who is eligible 
and on the types of activities that are funded. In some countries (i.e. Namibia, Malawi 
and Morocco) parties are granted subsidies for the funding of their ordinary activities, 
but not for electoral campaigns. In the rest (i.e. Angola, Kenya, Uganda, Mozambique, 
Tanzania and South Africa), state direct financial support can be employed for the 
funding of both. The type of parties that are beneficiary of public subsidies and the 
criteria used to distribute them varies. Most states (i.e. Namibia, South Africa, 
                                                 
4 The increase use of social media has been one of the ways used to level the playing field, as access to 
conventional media is limited (Masilo and Seabo 2015).   
 10
Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Malawi, and Morocco) adopted party regulations that 
mainly favor parties in parliament, and that limit funding to extra-parliamentary and 
smaller parties.  
In Tanzania the Political Parties Act (2002) states that only those parties that 
are registered, have participated in the immediate past election and elected at least 
one candidate, can get subvention from the state. The total grant of subventions to 
political parties should be no higher than 2% of the annual budget, less the amount 
payable in defraying the national debt. However, according to Chadema 
representatives the amount of money available to distribute among political parties 
falls below this percentage, which means that funding is insufficient for opposition 
parties’ needs (authors’ interview).  In terms of allocation criteria, 50 % of the money 
is disbursed on the basis of the number of constituencies won and the other 50% is  
awarded to parties that got at least 5% of the total number of valid votes cast (see 
Articles 15 to 19 of the Party Law). These provisions benefit the ruling Chama Cha 
Mapinduzi (CCM) which has never been replaced in power and enjoys comfortable 
majorities in parliament (Magolowondo, Falguera, and Matsimbe 2012). In 2016 the 
Registrar of Political Parties in Tanzania has proposed an amendment to the Political 
Parties Act and the Election Expenses Act (2010) to create a level playing field for 
political actors in the country; and opposition groups say they will seek to offer views 
on the planned law review scheduled for debate in Parliament in February 20195.  
The South African regulations (Political Party Act 1997) define two 
modalities of funding allocation for political parties that elected representatives in the 
legislative houses. The first is a proportional allocation of the money by dividing the 
funds proportionally among the represented political parties in accordance with the 
number of seats awarded to each party in the National Assembly and the provincial 
legislatures jointly. The second is an equitable allocation in which the amounts are 
allocated to the national and each of the provincial legislatures in proportion to the 
number of members of each of those legislatures; and the allocation to a particular 
legislature in terms of paragraph must be divided equally among the represented 
political parties in each of those legislatures. All amounts are paid to the represented 
political party in question in four equal instalments, each within three months of the 
                                                 
5  Tanzania parties registrar proposes changes to election expenses law to create fairness 
https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ea/Political-party-funding-in-Tanzania/4552908-3277104-
7is5qs/index.html; Tanzania: Movement Seeks to Thwart Amendment of Political Parties Act 
https://allafrica.com/stories/201812070574.html  (accessed on March 15 2019). 
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previous payment. The first instalment is paid within four weeks of the beginning of 
the financial year in question. 
However, there are a few cases where only some parliamentary parties will 
benefit. Thus, in Malawi and Morocco publicly funded parties are required to attain a 
minimum election threshold  to gain access to funding, meaning the exclusion of 
some “minor” parties with parliamentary representation.6 In Malawi any political 
party with more than one-tenth of the national vote in elections has sufficient funds to 
continue to represent its constituency (Constitution of the Republic of Malawi 1994, 
Article 40.2; Political Parties Act 2018, Article 21).  The law does not specify further 
details on how/when the funding is allocated just that the provision of funds to 
political parties is done quarterly.  
In Morocco there are annual funds for day-to-day party activities and 
additional funding for electoral campaigns (Articles 30 - 31 of the Party Law). The 
annual amount for day-to-day activities (Article 32), is given to political parties 
participating in the legislative elections, and running in at least 10% of the local 
constituencies in the election to the Chamber of Representatives: the amount is shared 
equally among the political parties (Article 32.a).  Additional funding is given to 
parties obtaining between 3%-5% of the votes, but an annual subsidy corresponds 
only to parties gaining at least 5% in the legislative elections (Article 32.b.c.).  The 
funding for electoral campaigns (Articles 34-36) takes place at the occasion of local, 
regional and legislatives elections. The global amount is fixed by the head of 
government, following the proposal of governmental authorities responsible for 
interior affairs, justice and finance. The money is allocated on the basis of the number 
of votes and seats (as stipulated under article 32). 
In Kenya the 2011 Political Parties Act guarantees state subsidies only to 
parties fulfilling the following criteria: (1) have obtained at least 3% of the votes in 
preceding general elections; (2) have at least one-third of candidates of candidates 
from the other gender; (3) display representation of special interest groups in its 
governing body, and (4) at least 20 members in the lower chamber, 3 in the high 
chamber, 3 governors and 40 local representatives. As a result, only major 
(nationalized) Kenyan parties benefit from the financial help of the state. The only 
                                                 
6 Three and six, respectively, after the last legislative elections. The case of the United Democratic 
Front (UDF) in Malawi is a bit more problematic, as it managed to obtain a not insignificant 9.6 per 
cent of the votes. 
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two countries to publicly fund non-parliamentary parties are Angola and 
Mozambique. In the latter, one third of the public subsidies are distributed among 
parliamentary parties and another third among all parties fielding candidates for 
parliament (Article 10 of Party Law 1991; Electoral Law 2014). In the former, the 
state budget stipulates annual subventions according to the vote share obtained in the 
prior elections (1000 kwanzas per vote) and   an additional funding to be distributed 
in  election years – and all parties legally registered  are entitled to this share (Article 
5 of Party Law 2012).  
 As far as the distribution of such type of subsidies is concerned, some 
countries opt for making it proportional to the electoral (i.e. Namibia) or 
parliamentary (i.e. Uganda) 7  support alone. Still others, like Morocco, prefer to 
combine both criteria (i.e. votes and seats). In Mozambique one third of public 
subsides is distributed according to the proportion of parliamentary candidates, and 
another third according to the proportion of seats.8 In South Africa part of the funds is 
distributed according to the latter, and the other part equally. Equality is also the 
formula adopted by Angola, and Uganda (even if just for the funding of elections). In 
Kenya, both the proportion of votes and candidates, but among “especial interest 
groups” are employed. Interestingly enough, none of the 13 African countries 
examined here has adopted a “matching-funds” type of regime, where part of the 
subsidies is made dependent on the capacity of parties to attract private contributions 
(either in the form of donations, like in Germany, or membership fees, like in the 
Netherlands, Thailand or Japan). 
Kenya is the only of the above-studied countries where the Party Law 
somehow “earmarks” public subsidies, requiring political parties to employ at least 
30% 
for purposes compatible with democracy including promoting the 
representation in Parliament and in the county assemblies of women, 9 
persons with disabilities, youth, ethnic and other minorities and 
marginalised communities (section 26). 
 
Although as reported in Ohman’s studies, either alone (2018) or with Lintari 
                                                 
7 In Uganda this is the case for the financing of parties’ ordinary activities only. 
8 The final third is reserved to candidates in presidential elections. 
9 In Morocco, a special Fund has also been created to support projects aiming to strengthen women 
participation in politics. 
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(2015), such legal imposition has not worked as initially expected, given some 
Kenyan parties’ try to get more women involved in politics, but without “real power”. 
Besides direct funding, states can also help parties (and candidates) in an 
indirect manner. The most popular is by guaranteeing them free access to media 
(television and radio in most cases). This is the case in most of the countries here 
examined, although while in Uganda the only beneficiaries are candidates, in 
Namibia only parties get access to free airtime. In all these, the distribution of the 
latter takes place equally. South Africa, Tanzania and Botswana are the only where 
both parties and candidates cannot rely on free airtime for their electoral campaigning. 
Conversely, in Malawi commercial advertisement for campaign purposes is forbidden 
for both parties and candidates. 
Other types of public funding, even if less popular are: (1) tax relief, like in 
Sierra Leone (customs duty on election campaign materials) or Angola (stamp duty, 
inheritance and gift tax, property tax, etc.);10 (2) free space for campaign materials 
like in Malawi; and (3) free of charge premises for campaign meetings like in 
Morocco, Mozambique or Botswana. Here, the Electoral Commission shall also 
provide services such printing, voter’s rolls, education materials for voters and 
transport for polling agents.11 The Moroccan party law has few mentions to indirect 
funding, but it states that parties can benefit from training to help them purse their 
activities, and also that they have free access to the use of state owned public spaces 
(Article 31). 
Finally, overall there are no funding mechanisms to help encourage gender 
balance within political parties in most of the countries covered. The only exceptions 
are Morocco and Kenya (see table 1).   However, it is important to note that in a 
growing number of African countries – e.g. Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Cabo 
Verde – there are funding incentives for parties that adopt gender equality laws 
(Ohman 2014). 
However, one thing is the formal regulation and another the actual practice. In 
this context, the party representatives we interviewed reported several challenges in 
how public funding is regulated and implemented. These are the most relevant: 
the criteria for allocation of public subsidies is not consensual: for instance, 
                                                 
10 Only for parliamentary parties though. 
11 Since 2010, the Party Law in Uganda also obliges the Government to contribute with “other public 
resources towards the activities of” parliamentary parties (section 14A). 
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the MDM in Mozambique recommends the creation of an additional funding 
mechanism, which is equally distributed among all parliamentary parties 
regardless of the number of seats it has in parliament; while the FDC in 
Uganda, and PDP in Namibia state that money should be allocated on the 
basis of percentage of votes and not of percentage of seats, has the latter 
criteria is more exclusionary and favors the ruling party; 
 state funding is clearly insufficient and opposition parties resort voluntary and 
compulsory fees to be able to raise extra money: for instance, MDM and 
Renamo in Mozambique, and Unita in Angola, stipulate that their elected 
representatives should donate a share of their salary to the party (somewhere 
between 5%-10%);  
 in election times, opposition parties often receive the funding with huge 
delays, sometimes after the start of the campaign period; however, the ruling 
party direct access to state resources creates an uneven playing field;  
 members of opposition often need to use their own resources – cars, staples, 
gas, houses, computers – and voluntary work to compensate the lack of 
funding; 
 there is lack of oversight of violations on public funding, or when it exists it 
aims mainly to control opposition and their supporters – but not the governing 
party.  
 
Private Funding 
 
Trying to avoid the excessive influence of private interests and guarantee party 
competition on an equal basis, many countries in Europe, Latin America and Asia 
have prohibited certain types of private contributions to political parties/candidates 
and/or introduce ceilings to the amounts received, either from natural or legal persons.  
Interestingly enough, and in relation to the former (i.e. donation bans), most 
of the African countries here examined have adopted a laissez-faire approach. This is 
especially visible among SADC members: namely, Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, 
South Africa and Zambia. There parties and/or candidates are allowed to receive 
donations from foreign sources, trade unions and (public or private) companies. Even  
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Table 1. Regulations on public funding in 13 African countries  
Region Country 
Are there 
provisions for 
direct public 
funding to 
political 
parties? 
What are the 
eligibility 
criteria?  
What is the 
allocation 
calculation? 
Are there 
provisions for 
how public 
funding should 
be used?  
Are there 
provisions for 
free or 
subsidized 
access to media 
for political 
parties? 
Are there 
provisions 
for free or 
subsidized 
access to 
media for 
candidates? 
Are there 
provisions for 
any other 
form of 
indirect public 
funding? 
Is the provision 
of direct public 
funding to 
political parties 
related to 
gender equality 
among 
candidates? 
Are there 
provisions for 
other financial 
advantages to 
encourage 
gender equality 
in political 
parties? 
Southern 
Africa  
Angola Yes 
Representation 
in elected body, 
participation in 
election 
Equal Ongoing party activities Yes Yes Tax relief No No 
Botswana No 
Not applicable 
Not applicable  Not applicable No No 
Premises for 
campaign 
meetings, 
Other 
No No 
Malawi Yes 
Share of votes 
in previous 
election 
No data No Yes Yes 
Space for 
campaign 
materials 
No No 
Mozambique Yes 
Representation 
in elected body, 
Share of seats 
in previous 
election, 
Number of 
candidates, 
participation in 
election 
Proportional to 
seats received; 
Proportional to 
candidates 
fielded 
Ongoing party 
activities Yes Yes 
Premises for 
campaign 
meetings 
No No 
Namibia Yes Representation in elected body 
Proportional to 
votes received No data Yes No No No No 
South Africa Yes Representation 
in elected body 
Equal; 
Proportional to 
seats received 
Other No No No No No 
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Tanzania, 
United 
Republic of 
Yes Representation 
in elected body 
No data 
Ongoing party 
activities, Intra-
party institution 
No No No data No No 
Zambia No Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Yes Yes No No No 
East 
Africa 
Kenya Yes 
Representation 
in elected body, 
Share of votes 
in previous 
election, Share 
of seats in 
previous 
election, 
Participation in 
election, 
Registration as 
a political party 
Proportional to 
votes/ seats 
received 
Campaign 
spending, 
Ongoing party 
activities, Intra-
party institution, 
Research and 
policy initiatives 
Yes Yes No Yes 
Yes, funds 
earmarked for 
gender activities 
Uganda Yes 
Representation 
in elected body 
Equal for 
campaign 
financing; 
Proportional to 
seats received for 
annual funding 
of political party 
activities 
No No Yes 
Other public 
resources, apart 
from public 
funding, should 
be contributed 
to political 
parties 
No No 
Western 
Africa  
Ghana No Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Yes Yes No No No 
Sierra Leone No Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Yes Yes Tax relief Not applicable No 
North 
Africa Morocco Yes 
Share of votes 
in previous 
election 
Proportional to 
votes/ seats 
received  
Campaign 
spending No data No data 
Premises for 
campaign 
meetings 
Yes Yes, funding to women 
Source: IDEA Political Finance Database. 
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anonymous donations, banned in Tanzania, 12  are allowed. The two Portuguese-
speaking countries in the group (i.e. Angola and Mozambique) have also adopted 
very liberal legislation in this respect, even if foreign donations are banned in both 
countries. Although in Mozambique, which also prohibits corporate donations 
altogether, such ban does not apply to “foreign citizens, friendly political parties of 
international non-governmental organizations” (Article 37 Electoral Law). Angola 
also bans donations made by companies that have a “majority or exclusive public 
ownership” (Article 94 Party Law). Other private companies are allowed to make 
donations, even those with government contracts. 
Other countries outside the SADC region are stricter. Thus, foreign donations 
- the first type of donations that most countries tend to ban, at least in Europe or Asia 
– are banned altogether in Morocco, but also in Ghana, Kenya, Sierra Leone (to 
parties) and Uganda (to candidates). In the latter case, foreign donations to political 
parties are allowed provided they do not exceed 400 million shillings (around 81,000 
pounds). 
Donations to political parties made by trade unions or corporations (both 
private and public) are prohibited in just few countries. Ghana also prohibits 
donations from trade unions, but allows those made by private companies, provided 
they are not being contracted by the government (Asante and Khunnath, 2018). In 
Morocco, both public companies and private corporations with a government contract 
are banned from donating to parties. In Kenya the prohibition only affects public 
companies. 
Similarly, to what can be observed in the European or Asian continents (Casal 
Bértoa and Biezen, 2018; Mobrand et al., forthcoming), most of the non-SADC 
countries examined here, although not Morocco, also ban anonymous donations to 
political parties. In both Kenya and Sierra Leone, the prohibition is extended even to 
donations made anonymously to candidates. 
Another type of bans leading also to avoid the partisan exploitation of state 
resources as well as the undue influence of the state in party politics, so characteristic 
of illiberal and authoritarian regimes, are those prohibiting the use of state resources 
in favor or against a party/candidate. Such prohibition is in place in all countries, but 
Angola, Botswana and South Africa. Finally, and in order to avoid external 
                                                 
12 According to section 19.2 of the Elections Expenses Act political parties are obliged “to keep 
records of names and postal, physical and electronic addresses of donors”. 
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influences in the political arena, Sierra Leone also explicitly forbids donations from 
terrorist organizations. 
In relation to the second type of donation restrictions, that is donation limits 
or caps, African countries tend to be very lenient, especially when compared to other 
world regions (e.g. Europe or Asia), where some type of caps for private 
contributions are the norm (Casal Bértoa and Biezen, 2018; Mobrand et al., 
forthcoming). In fact, and as it follows from table 2, the only SADC country to 
regulate a limit to the amount political parties can receive, both from natural and legal 
persons, is Tanzania.13 There 
 
no person or organization shall, in any one year contribute to a political 
party an amount, where in cash or in kind exceeding thirty percent of its 
annual total expenditure (section 54.2 of the 2017 Political Parties Act). 
 
Outside the SADC region, both Uganda and Morocco also establish caps for 
donations made to political parties, either by individuals or corporations, for the 
funding of their ordinary activities. Interestingly enough, both foresee flat rate yearly 
caps, from as little as 400 million shillings (around 81,000 pounds) in Uganda to as 
high as 100,000 dirhams (approximately 7,800 pounds) in Morocco. Kenya is the 
only case here examined to introduce caps to donations made during and outside the 
electoral campaign. In relation to the former, an individual or company cannot 
contribute to the funding of a party’s ordinary activities in more than five percent of 
its yearly total expenditure. 14  During the elections campaign, neither parties nor 
candidates can receive more than twenty percent of their total contributions from any 
single source, except in the case of “auto-donations”. 
 
Table 2. Donation limits in selected African countries (approximate amounts 
appear in pounds) 
Region Country Ordinary activities Electoral campaign 
Political Parties Candidates 
 
 
Angola - - - 
Botswana - - - 
                                                 
13 For donations made by a candidate to his/her own campaign, the Minister will decide on the basis of 
(1) the difference in the size of the electoral constituency, (2) the categories on the candidates, (3) the 
population, and (4) the communication infrastructure. 
14 In relation to the audited accounts in the previous year. 
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Southern 
African 
(Development 
Community) 
Malawi15 - - - 
Mozambique - - - 
Namibia - - - 
Tanzania ≤ 30% of the annual total 
expenditure of the political party 
for both L&N 
- n.d. 
South Africa - - - 
Zambia - - - 
 
Eastern 
Africa 
Kenya ≤ 5% of the annual total 
expenditure of the political party 
for both L&N 
≤ 20% of the total 
contributions received 
for both 
Uganda 400m (£ 81.1k)/year for both 
L&N 
- - 
Western 
Africa 
Ghana - - - 
Sierra Leone - - - 
Northern Africa Morocco 100k (£ 7.8k)/year for both 
L&N 
- - 
Notes: k = thousand; L = legal persons; m = millions; N = natural persons; n.d. = no data. 
 
This liberal approach to private funding in general, and donation limits in 
particular, is also visible when regulating in-kind donations. In fact, only four  
(Morocco for both parties and candidates as well as Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda 
only for the former) of the 13 African countries here studied contain some kind of 
limitation in this regard. In all these cases, the caps mentioned above apply. 
 All in all, and in clear comparison to other African countries outside the 
region, most SADC states have adopted a very liberal approach to the regulation of 
private funding. To the point that, for example, not only donors can participate in 
public tender and/or procurement processes, but also parties and candidates are able 
to take loans. The only restrictions are full disclosure in the case Botswana, 
registration in the country in the case of Angola as well as Ghana, and not 
contravening the limitation eventually imposed by the Independent Electoral and 
Boundaries Commission in Kenya. 
The only exception, perhaps, to this type of laissez-faire legislation is the 
prohibition to parties from engaging in commercial activities. This is the case in 
Namibia, South Africa, Angola, Tanzania, Ghana, and in some cases also Morocco. 
Although in the first two countries, the prohibition only explicitly refers to money 
                                                 
15  It is important to note thought that according to Art. 27 of the Malawian (2018) Party Law, 
donations of a least 1 and 2 millions kwacha (£1k and £2k from natural and legal persons, respectively 
need to be declared to the Registrar by the party beneficiary. 
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allocated to the finance of parties’ ordinary activities.16  
Private funding, can be an opportunity for smaller political parties to garner 
further resources, but in practice many problems persist. As our interviewees reported  
major donors tend to support the governing parties as exchange for patronage benefits,  
those who donate money to opposition parties fear backlash and often stay 
anonymous, and mechanisms of oversight are clearly absent, which means that in 
practice there is no control/ disclosure of how much “private” money parties raise, 
and how they use it. 
 
Campaign donations and electoral spending   
  
The disclosure of finance is an essential mechanism for public accountability, 
it increases perceived fairness and turns the electoral politics more credible not only 
for the political parties but also for the public. Thus, providing public access to how 
much money was raised, its sources and how it was spent empowers oversight and 
accountability in the government decision-making process. According to the Varieties 
of Democracy data, Africa is the region where campaign donations are more opaque, 
either there are no disclosure requirements or these are not enforced most of time (see 
figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Disclosure of campaign donations: cross-regional perspective  
 
Source: Coopedge et al. (2018)  
                                                 
16 In the case of Namibia such money might be use for acquiring or maintaining any immovable 
property, provided that is used by the party solely for party-political purposes. 
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Notes: 0 = No, there are no disclosure requirements; 1 = Not really, there are some, possibly partial, 
disclosure requirements in place but they are not observed or enforced most of the time; 2 = 
Ambiguous, there are disclosure requirements in place, but it is unclear to what extent they are 
observed or enforced; 3 = Mostly, the disclosure requirements may not be fully comprehensive (some 
donations not covered), but most existing arrangements are observed and enforced; 4 = Yes, there are 
comprehensive requirements and they are observed and enforced almost all the time. 
 
There are several examples of the opaqueness of campaign regulations and 
lack of oversight of illicit funding during elections. In Angola the ruling party 
Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) was recently accused by the 
largest opposition party – União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola 
(Unita)-, of receiving illicit funding from the Brazilian construction giant Odebrecht, 
which has been implicated in several corruption scandals in Brazil, Mozambique, and 
many Latin American countries17. The Angolan party law includes a ban on foreign 
funding to electoral campaign but Odebrecht might have donated 50 million dollars to 
the 2012 campaign of the incumbent President José Eduardo dos Santos18. A report 
on the 2014 elections in Mozambique, cited among many irregularities – ballot 
stuffing, late opening of polling states etc. –the fact that the Frelimo had a great 
advantage over their opponents in particular:  “It seemed to have more money and 
was giving away not just t-shirts, but bicycles, and had the cash to hire and buy cars - 
which was one reason for less use of state cars”.19  
These are just a few examples of illicit funding and abuse of state resources 
but represent a wider phenomenon where regulations are simply absent or are poorly 
enforced due to insufficient institutional capacity.  A way to reduce the undue 
influence of external forces, make political finances easy to control and, if possible, 
increase citizens’ trust in party politics is to limit both party and candidate spending 
during elections. However, most African countries here studied do not contemplate 
any limitations, neither for party nor campaign spending. 
As it follows from table 3, only four countries have stipulated spending limits 
either for parties or candidates. Morocco is perhaps the strictest establishing a limit of 
500 dirhams (around 40,000 pounds) per candidate. In Botswana the amount is not so 
high: just 50,000 pulas (approximately 3,500 pounds). In both Tanzania and Kenya 
                                                 
17  Odebrecht case: Politicians worldwide suspected in bribery scandal 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-41109132 (Accessed on 15 March 2019). 
18 Geisel, Lula, and Temer support the dictatorship in Angola https://litci.org/en/geisel-lula-and-temer-
support-the-dictatorship-in-angola/ (Accessed on 15 March 2019). 
19  Mozambique political process bulletin Issue 56 - 28 November 2014. 
http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/f
iles/Mozambique_Bulletin_56_Election_results_2014%281%29.pdf (Accessed on 15 March 2019). 
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parties are capped in their spending. However, and contrary to the former two 
countries, the Tanzanian and Kenyan legislations leave, respectively, to the Minister 
responsible for political parties (Mpp) and the Electoral and Boundaries Commission 
(EBC) the decision on the maximum amount to be spent for a particular election, 
either by parties or candidates. The common criteria to be considered by both of the 
abovementioned authorities are: (1) the type of election; (2) the size of the electoral 
circumscription; (3) its population; and (4) the communication infrastructure present 
there. The Kenyan Election Campaign Financing Act of 2013 adds a fifth element: 
namely, the number of party members in that area. In Kenya, it is also up to the EBC,  
after consultations with political parties, officers responsible for the state-
owned media enterprises and authorities responsible for the regulation of 
media in Kenya, [to] set out the limit of media coverage of a candidate, 
political party or a referendum committee, which shall include paid up 
advertisement and free broadcasting spots or coverage in the print media 
(section 20).20 
 
Table 3. Spending limits in selected African countries 
Region Country Parties Candidates 
 
Southern 
African 
Development 
Community 
Angola - - 
Botswana - 50k (£3.5k) 
Malawi - - 
Mozambique - - 
Namibia - - 
Tanzania Decided by Mpp 
South Africa - - 
Zambia - - 
East 
Africa 
Kenya Decided by EBC prior to elections 
Uganda - - 
South 
Asia 
Ghana - - 
Sierra Leone - - 
North Africa Morocco - 500k (£39.3k) 
Notes: EBC = Electoral and Boundaries Commission; Mpp = Minister responsible for political parties. 
 
Vote buying 
 
Vote buying is particularly pervasive in third wave democracies; and Africa is the 
                                                 
20 At the last 2015 presidential elections in Tanzania, the total limit of campaign expenses for each 
political party was 17 billion schillings (around £5.7 million). At the 2017 general elections in Kenya, 
parties could not spend more than 15 billion shillings (KES) - around 114 million pounds, while the 
EBC established different thresholds for presidential contenders (KES5.2 billion – £39.5 million); MPs 
(33 million - £251k); governors, senators and female representatives (KES432 million - £3.3 million), 
or members of county assemblies (10.3 million - £78k). Sources: EUOM (2015) and Daily Nation, 
respectively. 
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region scoring higher in terms of vote buying in elections and the situation has not 
improved since the 1990s, when democratic experiments started (Figure 2).  Many of 
the party representative interviewed report episodes where incumbent parties resorted 
to small gifts and other forms of inducement to buy voter support.  This is in clear 
contrast with the existing legal framework, as most countries ban vote buying. 
 
Figure 2. Election vote buying: cross-regional perspective  
 
Source: Coopedge et al. (2018) 
Notes: 0 = Yes, there was systematic, widespread, and almost nationwide vote/turnout buying by 
almost all parties and candidates; 1 = Yes, some, there were non-systematic but rather common vote-
buying efforts, even if only in some parts of the country or by one or a few parties; 2: Restricted, 
money and/or personal gifts were distributed by parties or candidates but these offerings were more 
about meeting an ‘entry-ticket' expectation and less about actual vote choice or turnout, even if a 
smaller number of individuals may also be persuaded; 3 = Almost none, there was limited use of 
money and personal gifts, or these attempts were limited to a few small areas of the country. In all, 
they probably affected less than a few percent of voters; 4 = None, there was no evidence of 
vote/turnout buying. 
 
In Angola vote buying is known as “banho”, a Portuguese expression that 
means “bath” in English and that encompasses all sorts of inducements - money, food, 
employment and scholarships – politicians use to "bathe" citizens in exchange for 
votes at the polls. The Angolan electoral law comprises mechanisms to punish 
electoral corruption:  
to persuade someone to vote or not for party or candidate, to offer or promise public 
or private employment, or any patrimonial advantage to one or more voters, even if 
by interposing, even if the things offered or promised are disbursed as pecuniary aid 
to defray expenses of any nature, prison sentence of two to eight years and a fine of 
Kz 250,000.00 to Kz 1,500,000.00 (Article 205). 
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Despite the existing provisions opposition parties often accuse the ruling MPLA of 
vote buying21.  Tanzania and Malawi are also instructive of vote buying practices in 
Africa. In 2000 the Tanzania legalized the “distribution of small gifts (known as 
“takrima” in Kiswahili) at campaign meetings or rallies”; with the justification that 
takrima “represented a traditional form of African hospitality to attendees at 
campaign rallies” (Croke 2017). The legal institutionalization of this informal 
practice, led to its widespread use in the  general elections of 2000 and 2005 
particularly by the ruling CCM;  before it was  banned in 2006 (Tsubura 2015). In 
Malawi where reports of vote buying have also been recurrent in elections22 , a 
landmark law has been recently approved to forbid politicians of using cash payments 
and other incentives to buy support. The Political Parties Act, which came into force 
on 1 December 2018, will see candidates convicted of improperly swaying the 
electorate face fines of up to 10-million kwacha ($13,600) or five years in prison.23  
The members of opposition parties interviewed in this study, reported several 
episodes where the incumbent parties resorted to small gifts (e.g. t-shirts, capulanas 
or chitenge, bicycles) to persuade voters, which suggests that despite the existing 
regulations, vote buying remains pervasive in elections.   
 
Oversight 
 
But all the abovementioned regulations might not be worth the paper where they are 
written without a proper oversight regime, in terms of both reporting and control. In 
this context, and at least formally, most of the 13 African countries here examined 
require political parties to report regularly on their finance, even if Angola parties 
only have to do so regarding state subsidies only. The only exceptions to such 
annual24 reporting obligation are located in the SADC region: namely, Botswana, 
Malawi and Zambian, although in the latter country parties might be requested to 
                                                 
21  João Lourenço acusado de corrupção eleitoral em Angola https://www.dw.com/pt-
002/jo%C3%A3o-louren%C3%A7o-acusado-de-corrup%C3%A7%C3%A3o-eleitoral-em-angola/a-
39258200 (19 March 2019). 
22 Why Malawi took so long to declare an election winner https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2014/may/30/malawi-failed-declared-election-winner (Accessed on 15 March 2019) 
23 Malawi aims to put an end to vote buying https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2018-12-
02-malawi-aims-to-put-an-end-to-vote-buying/. 
24 Usually three (e.g. Sierra Leone, Morocco) or six (e.g. Ghana, Namibia) months after the end of the 
calendar or financial year. The South African (2 months) and Tanzanian (9 months) legislations are, 
respectively, the most and less time pressing. 
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provide financial information. 25  A recent statement from Zambia Elections 
Information Centre prior to the 2016 elections, stated that “Due to the closed nature 
of the campaign framework, Zambia has not been able to adequately track monies 
expended by political parties during elections. It is therefore not possible to 
benchmark the current party financing against any past expenditure26.  
 Legislations in the four regions here studied are equally compelling in relation 
to electoral campaign reporting. Thus, and with the exception of South Africa and 
again Malawi and Zambia, all other legislations include an obligation to submit 
campaign financial reports some time after the elections have taken place.27 Although 
in Ghana only parties – but not candidates - are obliged to do so. In Namibia, both 
political parties and third parties, but again not candidates, must report on donations 
(only foreign ones in the case of parties) made over a certain amount. 
 In terms of the content and the transparency of the reports, we must say that, 
with the only exceptions of South Africa and Tanzania, in all those countries where 
parties have a formal reporting obligation (see above) reports need to be made public. 
The way in which party and/or campaigning reports are made public varies though: 
from publication in newspapers (e.g. Angola) or by the National Electoral 
Commission (e.g. Mozambique; Sierra Leone) to public access upon request (e.g. 
Morocco; Kenya, Uganda), usually after the payment of a reasonable fee. In Ghana, 
both public access and publication by parties is possible. 
 In terms of the content, the Angolan, Tanzanian, Kenyan and Sierra Leone’s 
legislations require parties and/or candidates to include itemized information on both 
spending and income, including also an obligation to report on the identity of donors. 
The same is the case for both Namibian and Ghanaian parties (but not candidates). 
South African parties are also obliged to itemized their income – but not their 
spending - in their financial reports, but without a need to report on the identity of 
donors. The latter however is an obligation in Mozambique and Uganda, although 
there party reports might not be itemized at all. Finally, in Morocco reporting has just 
a purely formal character. 
 In terms of oversight, however, it is perhaps even more important that a 
                                                 
25 No obligation to do it on a regular basis though. 
26  2016 election campaigns gobble over US$11Million, PF spent US$6 Million 
https://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/08/10/2016-election-campaigns-gobble-us11million-pf-spent-us6-
million/ (Accessed on 15 March 2019) 
27 Kenyan legislation even extends such requirement to lobbying entities. 
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suitable and independent authority, with sufficient competence and resources, is 
given the enough powers to exercise an adequate control of the finances of political 
parties and/or candidates. The types of oversight institutions in the African continent 
go from parliamentary (e.g. in Angola) to judicial (e.g. in Botswana) through 
administrative (e.g. in most countries). Interestingly enough, and in clear contrast to 
what can be observed in some European democracies (Biezen and Casal Bértoa, 2014 
and Casal Bértoa and Biezen, 2018), neither governmental institutions nor parties 
play a role in terms of political finance oversight.28 
 In most countries the reception of annual financial reports is left to the 
National Electoral Commission, although not in Kenya, Tanzania, Morocco and 
Sierra Leone. In the latter, it is the Register of Political Parties that takes care of that. 
In the first two countries, it is this institution, together with the Auditing Agency. In 
Morocco, both the reception and the examination of political finance reports are 
under the competence of the Auditors Office. Although in most countries the same 
institution (usually the Electoral Commission) is in charge of receiving and 
examining party and/or candidate reports, in others the competences are split. 
Auditing of financial reports is left to the Auditing authorities in Angola, Namibia 
and South Africa. In Mozambique and Botswana such function corresponds to the 
courts, while Kenya is the only country that distinguishes between the auditing of 
electoral campaigns (done by the Electoral Commission) and ordinary party finances 
(undertaken by the Party Register). In Tanzania, Kenya and Morocco, oversight 
authorities are even allowed to impose sanctions. It is to the study of the latter that we 
dedicate the next section.  
 
Sanctions 
 
 Without “clear, realistic, effective, dissuasive and proportional” sanctions 
even the best political finance legislation becomes inefficient (OSCE/ODIHR 
Guidelines on Political Party Regulation, Council of Europe-2003/4 and 1516-2001). 
 
  
                                                 
28 The same is the case for political parties in Asia (Mobrand et al., forthcoming). 
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Figure 3. Number of types of sanctions in selected African countries 
 
As is other world regions (Casal Bértoa and Biezen, 2018; Mobrand et al., 
forthcoming), pecuniary fines are the most popular type of sanctions. Thus, all SADC 
countries, except Tanzania, foresee one type of monetary fine or another. The other 
only country where fines are absent is Morocco. Prison is the second most popular 
type of sanction, although neither of the two abovementioned countries, nor Angola 
regulate such possibility in case of financial violations. Loss (Namibia, South Africa, 
Tanzania and Morocco) or suspension (Angola, and Kenya) of public funding as well 
as party de-registration (Tanzania, Zambia and Uganda) or suspension (Morocco) or 
both (Kenya) are less popular, not to talk about loss of political rights (Kenya, 
Tanzania, Botswana, Ghana and Sierra Leone) or forfeiture (Kenya, Namibia, South 
Africa and Uganda). Angolan and Mozambican legislations also sanction certain 
financial violations with the loss of tax exemptions and a candidate’s nomination, 
respectively. The Malawian legislation provides no sanctions at all, being the most 
liberal country among those studied in this report (figure 3). Conversely, the most 
punitive law is found in Kenya where parties committing finance infractions face 
multiple types of legal actions (Articles 28 to 30, Political Parties Act 2011). Namibia, 
South Africa and Uganda, all with four different types of sanctions each, are also to 
be considered among the strictest in this study, although not necessarily the most 
effective. 
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Key findings 
 
1. Out of 13 countries, only four do not provide any type of direct political 
funding neither for parties nor for candidates: Botswana, Zambia, Ghana and 
Sierra Leone (see table 1); 
2. Most parties are allowed to use public subsidies to fund both their electoral 
campaigns and ordinary activities. The only exceptions are Namibia, Malawi 
and Morocco, where funding can only be employed for the latter;  
3. Most public funding regulations tend to favor parliamentary, and in 
particular ruling parties. Only in some countries (Namibia, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Malawi and Morocco) public funding reaches 
smaller (and extra-parliamentary) parties. For this reason, most 
representatives of the (opposition) parties interviewed consider public funding 
inadequate and/or insufficient;29 
4. In terms of private funding, whereas anonymous donations are generally 
banned, foreign donations are allowed in most countries, together with 
donations from trade unions and/or private companies (some partial 
exceptions include Ghana, Kenya and Morocco). In this context, most 
opposition parties’ members stress the importance of private funding for their 
activities, while recognizing at the same time that individual donors often do 
not support their parties because of fears of backlash.30 
5. Party agents/activists often resort to their own personal resources (e.g. cars, 
gas, staples, computers) to finance campaign initiatives. Moreover, in some 
cases, party statutes stipulate that a share of an elected representative’s (at 
national and local level) salary be donated to his/her own party;   
6. With very few exceptions (i.e. Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda and Morocco), 
African countries tend to be very lenient on donation limits or caps, especially 
when compared to other world regions;  
7. With even more exceptions (i.e. Tanzania, Kenya and Morocco), electoral or 
party spending is not at all limited; 
                                                 
29 Specific changes in party funding regulations were therefore suggested with the aim of leveling the 
playing field. 
30 It should be borne in mind that, given the absence or very low levels of democracy in some of the 
countries here examined, funding is often offered in exchange for public contracts/projects, jobs, and 
patronage in general. 
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8. In terms of disclosure and implementation, Africa has the “honour” of having 
the most opaque campaign donations and the higher levels of vote buying (see 
Figures 1 and 2);   
9. Although vote buying is prohibited in all countries, in practice many forms of 
inducements and clientelism are used to buy voter support;31  
10. With few exceptions (i.e. Botswana, Malawi and Zambia), political parties 
are required to report regularly on their finance. In practice, however, there 
is lack of transparency and will, together with insufficient means, to oversight 
parties’ finance; and 
11. Pecuniary fines are the most popular type of sanctions followed by prison, 
while party de-registration and loss (or suspension) of funding are much less 
common.32 
 
Recommendations 
 
How can parties in Africa address the challenges of funding? There are; for 
sure, several contextual differences as the nature of electoral politics and the strength 
of political parties also vary. However, the combined information gathered in this 
report allows us to advance some recommendations: 
 
1. Countries should introduce a generous regime of public subsidies, a more 
proportional formula (e.g. “percentage of votes”) than the usually employed 
“percentage of seats”. This would allow not only for a less discriminatory 
distribution of state funds, but also for the extension of state help to non-
parliamentary parties with a certain level of support (e.g. 3 percent of the 
vote). With the benefits this might have for the survival of political parties, 
the institutionalization of the party system, the reduction of support for anti-
establishment parties and, more importantly, the consolidation of democracy; 
2. Earmark a proportion of public subsidies to promote the participation of 
women (e.g. 20%) and youth (e.g. 10%) in politics as well as the capacity 
                                                 
31  Persistent episodes of vote buying, illicit funding, abuse of state resources, and authoritarian 
behavior, mainly by the incumbent party, were reported by many of the opposition representatives 
interviewed. 
32 Kenya, Namibia, South Africa and Uganda display the strictest sanctionatory frameworks, although 
not necessarily the most effective. 
 30
building and civic education of members, followers and/or sympathizers; 
3. Ban of foreign donations and those made by (public or private) companies 
which, tending to favor parties in power, might exercise an illegitimate 
influence in the outcome of the decision-making process and the adoption of 
specific policies;    
4. Introduction of adequate and proportionate limits both for donations and 
spending, with the aim of reducing (1) the undue influence of wealthy 
individuals and (2) over-spending temptations, as well as (3) equalizing the 
playing field and compensating the “advantage of origin” characteristic of 
hegemonic and/or predominant parties; 
5. Reinforcement of oversight, with the creation of independent control bodies 
with the effective power and resources (both human and financial) to make 
political parties (both in government and opposition) accountable;  
6. Use of new technologies to increase the publicity, transparency and topicality 
of party finance reporting; 
7. Introduction and implementation of credible, proportionate and discouraging 
sanctions, including criminal liability and total loss of public subsidies,33 for 
the gravest types of political finance violations; 
8. Organization of workshops leading to a better training of party delegates in 
areas of political communication, campaign activities and, especially, fund 
raising. 
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Appendix 1. Documentation consulted per country  
Region Country Description and sources   
Southern Africa 
(Development 
Community) 
Angola Party Finance Law No. 10/12, 22 March 2012  Available at: http://www.tribunalconstitucional.ao/uploads/%7Bde0141b8-591a-4f3c-800a-4907d0711dbb%7D.pdf 
Botswana  Electoral Act, Act No. 38 of 1968 Available at: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=81612&p_country=BWA&p_count=182 
Malawi Political Parties Act, 2018,2 February 2018 Available at: https://malawilii.org/mw/legislation/act/2018/1 
Mozambique 
Law on Political Parties No. 7/91, 23 January 1991  
https://www.mcnet.co.mz/Files/Legislacao/Leis/Lei_7_1991.aspx   
Law on Campaign Finance No. 12/2014 of 23 April 2014 
Available at: http://www.cconstitucional.org.mz/Legislacao/Lei-Eleitoral  
Namibia 
Electoral Act 2014 
Available at: http://www.ecn.na/documents/27857/193258/Electoral+Act+5+of+2014.pdf/1bd1c3e3-bdd1-4183-a2fa-
2ae6e397180e  
South Africa Political Party Act 1997, Act No. 103 of 1997 Available at: https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/a103-97.pdf 
Tanzania 
The Political Parties Act [CAP 258 R.E. 2002] 
Available at:  http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/africa/TZ/tanzania-the-political-parties-act-1992/at_download/file  
European Union Election Observation Mission, United Republic of Tanzania Final Report General Elections 2015 
Available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/eueom/documents/eu-eom-tz-2015-fr_en.pdf 
Zambia The Electoral (Code of Conduct) Regulations, 2011  Available at: http://crm.misa.org/upload/web/electoral_code_of_conduct_2011.pdf  
Eastern Africa 
Kenya 
Political Parties Act No. 11 of 2011 
Available at: http://www.kenyalaw.org/lex//index.xql#P  
Election Campaign Financing, Act No. 42 of 2013 
Available at: http://www.kenyalaw.org/lex//index.xql#P  
IEBC caps political aspirants, party expenditure in 2017 polls 
Available at : https://www.nation.co.ke/news/IEBC-caps-political-aspirants-party-expenditure-in-2017-polls/1056-3340778-
sxtd31z/index.html  
Uganda 
Political Parties and Organizations Act, 2005 
Available at: https://www.ec.or.ug/docs/political%20parties%20and%20organisation%20Act%202005.pdf  
Political Parties and Organisations (Amendment) Act, 2010 
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Available at: https://ulii.org/ug/legislation/act/2015/13-3 
Western Africa 
Ghana Political Parties Act, 2000 Available at: http://ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/56820/101270/F697713047/GHA56820.pdf 
Sierra Leone The Political Parties Act, 2002  Available at: http://www.parliament.gov.sl/dnn5/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=x0uhWM-1OMU%3D&tabid=79&mid=635 
Northern Africa Morocco Organic Law of Political Parties No. 29.11, 22 October 2011   Available at: http://www.chambredesrepresentants.ma/sites/default/files/bo_5992_fr_loi2911.pdf  
Note: Documents assessed until 1 January 2019. 
